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Review of Economy and Management. 2017, (03)

An Empirical Study of the Impacts of Executive Compensation Incentive upon the Equity Agency CostChinese Full Text

ZHU Desheng;ZHANG Wei;School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics;

Abstract: According to agency theory,equity agency costs can be subdivided into the first class,agency costs caused by conflict of interest between shareholders and managers,and the second class,agency costs between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. This paper takes China’s 2010-2015 A-share listed companies as samples to examine the effect of executive compensation incentive on the first class agency costs between shareholders and managers. The research shows that there is a U-shaped rel... More
Keywords：

Executive compensation; Executive incentive; Cash pay; Executive’s holding; Proportion; Equity agency; Cost;

  • DOI：

    10.13962/j.cnki.37-1486/f.2017.03.008

  • Series：

    (J) Economics ＆ Management

  • Subject：

    Enterprise Economy

  • Classification Code：

    F271;F272.92

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